



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

TWENTIETH CENTURY DEMOCRACY.

IN his history of the Commonwealth of England¹ Mr. Gardiner remarks that the proposals of its founders "were often such as to commend themselves to the men of the nineteenth, perhaps even to the men of the twentieth century, rather than to those of the seventeenth."

History, as it becomes scientific, becomes more and more prophetic. Science reveals law, and a knowledge of law confers the power to forecast the future. The one original source of history is the present experience of living men. So long as it is confessed that the present age cannot be understood, or its true history be written, till its actors are dead, it ought to be confessed that no age can be understood, that no true history can be written. A true history is not written by discreetly waiting till the actors are dead and the mouth of every troublesome witness is stopped, and then attempting to construct a living society out of the broken fragments that remain. This is the way to write fiction: it is a cheap and easy way to delude the unwary into the acceptance as true of that which is false. The measure of one's ability to construct a true history out of the broken fragments of the past is his ability correctly to apprehend present living forces.

The growth of democracy is the fact most often encountered in all attempts to understand our own age. We hear of the democratization of industries, of literature, of philosophy and even of the Catholic Church. It is a question of great importance whether this is a permanent tendency or whether it is a temporary incident due to exceptional causes. From the passage quoted above, it would seem that the historian of the seventeenth century in England expects the continued growth of democracy in the near future. Mr. Lecky, who has lived

¹ History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. By Samuel Rawson Gardiner, M.A. London and New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. — 2 vols., 515, 503 pp.

much in the eighteenth century, while fearing many direful calamities on account of the coming in of democracy, seems to accept its advent as inevitable. Sir Henry Maine, equally impressed with the dangers of democracy, entertained a hope that there might be a return to what he deemed the safer principles of monarchy. The question is by no means an idle one. Its decision ought to affect a large part of ordinary conduct.

There is substantial agreement as to the fact of present democratic tendencies. For a study of the origin of these tendencies and for the observation of their working, no field of history is more fruitful than that chosen by Mr. Gardiner. The great debate between the English monarchs and the House of Commons began in the reign of Elizabeth. It continued without interruption during the time of the first two Stuarts. Gardiner's special studies cover the greater part of this period. His last two volumes are devoted to the first five years of the Commonwealth. The great debate did not directly involve the question of democracy as against monarchy, but rather the relative importance of the various factors in Parliament. The king held that it was the duty of the two Houses to coöperate with the monarch in making laws and in strengthening the administration. He considered himself sovereign both in lawmaking and in administration. The House of Commons, on the other hand, maintained that in the making of laws and in the determination of policies the two Houses were supreme, that it was the duty of the king faithfully to execute the laws, that the king was subject to law. The emergencies of the debate led the Commons to appeal to the English nation, as above both king and Parliament. The House of Commons, as being more directly representative of the nation, was alleged to be above king and lords. It was this feature of the controversy that tended to suggest a democratic theory of government. In the stress of civil war such a theory was evolved.

At no time during the Civil War or the Commonwealth, however, did the believers in democracy represent any considerable portion of the people. Those were convinced democrats whose clamors led to the death of the king, but they received

scant recognition in the conduct of the government. The apparent effect of the Puritan Revolution was to strengthen all prejudices against democracy. But the debate begun in the time of Elizabeth went on after the restoration of the Stuarts, until now, in the latter part of the Victorian age, there seems to be a very general conviction that the people of England may choose their rulers and govern themselves as they please. This conviction has been attained after one of the longest debates of a single question to be found in the annals of history. The participants have been statesmen and jurists inferior to none. Democracy has prevailed, however, not on account of arguments urged in its favor, but rather in spite of every possible argument urged against it. Every available device to avoid the trial of democracy appears to have been employed, and the acceptance of the experiment has been brought about rather by the logic of events than by the persuasiveness of advocates. This fact brings us again to the question: Are the forces making for democracy permanent or temporary?

One of the important factors in the English Revolution was the new generation of Bible-reading Puritans. To these Bible-readers Abraham was not called to found a great nation, but rather to be a minister of blessing to all the families of men. The founding of a great nation was a mere incident. Kings were not set up to make laws for the government of men: on the contrary, kings arose in Israel because of the sins of the people. The people were fairly warned that their kings would grow more and more tyrannical — that royal power would be more and more abused. If kings ruled at all, it was their duty to obey the law. If a king did not obey the law, it was the duty of the private citizen to denounce him to his face. To the righteous law of God ruler and subject owed equal obedience. Convictions such as these were the soul of the Puritan revolt.

There never was a time when Bible-readers were so numerous as they are to-day. A few years ago the Chicago dailies published the whole of the revised version of the New Testament as matter of news for their readers; and for days the streets of the great cities were thronged with persons peddling copies

of the book. Many languages and dialects have been reduced to writing for the express purpose of placing the Scriptures in the hands of the people. More and more the Bible is going into the hands of the common people in all Christian lands ; and it seems that the reading of the Bible still shows the same tendency, as in the seventeenth century, to weaken the hold of kings and of the ecclesiastical hierarchy upon the people.

The Puritans were called Old-Testament Christians. The direct words of command, which abound in the Old Testament, requiring the doing of definite things seemed peculiarly fitted to lead the common people to withstand tyrannical rulers. Bible-readers of to-day attach less weight to the commands of the Old Testament. The stress of attention is rather upon the more positive and aggressive principles of righteousness found in the Gospels. But surely the New Testament in the hands of the common people tends equally to weaken the hold of all who are disposed to exercise unjust lordship.

In the more advanced Christian nations there is not now that exclusive devotion to Bible-reading which existed in Puritan England. Much of the people's other reading, however, has an influence not less democratic. A large part of the literature which is distinctly anti-Christian in its spirit is democratic in its teaching, or it directly attacks monarchy and hierarchy. On the other hand, nearly all teaching which to-day gives positive support to undemocratic forms of government is opposed to toleration in religion and to freedom of thought and of teaching.

It is a matter of considerable interest in the study of modern tendencies that the doctrine of religious toleration and that of democratic government in church and state came prominently into notice at the same time and were advocated in many instances by the same persons. All democrats in the time of the Civil War and the Commonwealth were believers in toleration. The believers in toleration, however, were by no means all democrats. Cromwell had little sympathy with the political plans of the democrats ; yet during all his public career he was consistently tolerant. The duty of toleration was one of the settled convictions to which he held amid all changes.

From the Commonwealth to the present day there has been a continuous movement toward religious toleration. The advance has not been uninterrupted : there have been reactions, yet, on the whole, each century has shown marked progress. The growth of democratic sentiment has been even less uniform than that of toleration, yet there is enough correspondence to suggest a natural relation between the two movements. Catholic emancipation was forced upon an unwilling king only a few years before the Reform Act was forced through an unwilling House of Lords. Religious toleration is assumed in the most successful democracies. The essential principle of toleration is implied in every revolt of the individual against the evil practices of rulers. Every Hebrew prophet who withstood king or priest illustrated the principle. Throughout the entire history of the Christian Church there were martyrs to a demand for a higher standard of morality among rulers. The great Protestant Reformation was simply the most conspicuous of a number of similar movements. In the Christian Church there was always a practice of toleration. On a wide range of subjects there was freedom of discussion and of belief. Only those teachings were repressed which seemed to threaten the authority of the rulers. That which was really new in the toleration of the Puritan Revolution was the distinct enunciation of the policy that government ought not to exercise authority over the individual conscience. This policy had a democratic birth. It arose among those Christians who held that all authority in the Church rested with the whole body of believers in each separate local assembly. It had been practiced in Rhode Island for ten years before the organization of the New Model. Men from New England were leaders in the army. Cromwell, while not a democrat in his theory of state, was a democrat in church government. All these facts create a presumption that there is a close relation between religious toleration and democracy, and that the principle is not ephemeral, but is as old as the passion for righteousness in the human soul.

A vital relation everywhere obtains between the nature of the government and the education of the people. It was the

duty of the Hebrew father to instruct his children in the promises delivered to his ancestors and in the mission of the Jewish race to the world. Because of this teaching we have to-day a disembodied Hebrew nation still holding itself in readiness to fulfill a contract made and sealed four thousand years ago. Before the Puritan Revolution, the Elizabethan age had illuminated England — Bacon and Shakespeare had lived and taught. Milton was a part of the Revolution, and an important part. The educational movement which prepared the way for this Revolution began, however, before the time of Elizabeth. From the days of Wycliffe there had been an undercurrent of Christian teaching, never wholly subject to governmental control, always distinctly hostile to tyrannical authority.

Since the Puritan age there have been changes in the methods and spirit of education so sweeping and so radical that we have great difficulty in understanding them or in comprehending their probable effects. The beginning of the new education may conveniently be dated about a hundred years ago, with the work of Pestalozzi and Froebel. Pestalozzi was overpowered with a sense of the injustice and brutality visited upon the poor of his countrymen by those in authority. In this respect, however, he did not differ from thousands of Hebrew prophets and Christians teachers who had preceded him. It was the same sentiment that led St. Francis to defy every earthly authority and make himself a companion of lepers. Pestalozzi began his work by an attempt to arouse the moral sense of the adults of his city. Here again he was in the old beaten track. Not until he found that the adults were already spoiled by a wrong education was he induced to turn to the child. More than two thousand years ago the Greeks taught that rational human government rested upon the education of children. The Greeks lived in perfect good conscience upon the labor of slaves and by acts of robbery committed against aliens; and it was in part, at least, the obtuseness of their moral sense that enabled them to do a bit of clear thinking that has been of immense importance to the world. The morality of the Greeks was a morality for masters; yet within

a limited field they discerned fundamental principles that are true for all conditions. If Plato had organized a school among the children of outcast Greek slaves with the definite intention of rendering it impossible for any Greek to continue to be a master of slaves, he would have been doing a work quite like that of Pestalozzi and Froebel. These Christian teachers aimed not simply at new methods in education, but rather at a more just order in the state. They had the Greek idea of making pedagogy contribute to demagoguery, or a more righteous political leadership. They made truth their sole authority. They were driven to the study of nature as the most available means of inculcating a love of truth. This line of teaching was in harmony with the contemporary effort for the advancement of science, and contributed much to its triumphs.

We are not always conscious of the fact that there is a close relation between cold-blooded material science and that enthusiasm for humanity which has characterized popular educational movements. Yet it is easy enough to see that there could not have been a scientific age, such as that in which we are living, had there not been a succession of prophets and teachers who were ready to brave constituted authority for the sake of more just relations among men. The prophets have always been lovers of truth and haters of lying; but in past ages the promoters of righteousness have been truth-loving and truth-telling chiefly in dealing with subjective experiences, and have failed to maintain this spirit in dealing with matters external. Bad men and good men alike have been victims of false beliefs in much that pertains to this external material world, and in nearly all that pertains to political and social relations. Only since the recent triumphs of science have there been large bodies of men who are practiced in seeing according to ability and believing according to evidence in a field of external observation. There had been ages of theoretic teaching of the abstract duty of keeping the mind open to the truth, but the practice of seeing and believing according to prejudice was practically universal. Modern science supplies to the preacher of righteousness that which he has long needed. It furnishes a fulcrum for the

lover of truth and righteousness in a world where none existed before.

It should be observed, however, that the habit of seeing and believing with the whole mind has even now been attained only in a very limited field. The new law prevails in the chemical laboratory. In biology it prevails until the political and social relations of men are reached. Here the old law of seeing and believing according to prejudice still holds. Thus, we have recently had in the United States an election in which one question involved was whether the gold dollar had appreciated in value during the last twenty years. About six millions of mature citizens believed that it had appreciated, and about six millions more, with the same evidence accessible to them, held the opposite opinion. In politics men still believe, not according to evidence, but according to their interests or their prejudices.

We may reasonably expect that early in the twentieth century men will appear who will maintain a complete openness of mind to all political and social phenomena, who will keep all faculties at their best in order to know all that is true and who will conscientiously report without color that which is perceived. This expectation is based upon changes already wrought. The medical profession, for example, is being reconstructed in harmony with the new education. This profession, dealing, as it does, with physical science and also with matters social and political, is actually carrying the principles of science into politics. In the city politics of the day we see men devoted to almost every variety of injustice and crime, but we find no champions of diphtheria or typhoid. It is only in Gloucester, England, the home of Jenner, that the constituted authorities of our day insist upon the murder of innocents out of regard for an ancient prejudice.¹ If any one doubts that there has been a revolution in the medical profession in the last century, let him compare the introduction of anti-toxine with that of vaccination a hundred years ago. Vaccination met the strenuous opposition of a considerable body of influential people, who insisted upon believing, not according to evidence, but accord-

¹ Parliamentary Report on Smallpox Plague in Gloucester, 1896.

ing to prejudice. And this organized unbelief has continued to the present day. The medicine man of the remote past was a dealer in occult forces in alliance with privilege and tyranny. In the future the medical profession is to be in alliance with those political and social forces which make for the perfection of the race. Its chief task will not be the curing of diseases or even the prevention of disease: it will be to give effect to positive agencies for improving the race.

A statistician has reported that a contemporary of Pestalozzi administered corporal punishment in school more than a million times. This is an exaggerated case of the old method of school government. Only in 1888 was the practice of caning abolished at Winchester College, England. It is the aim of the new education to govern young people as rational beings, and a resort to corporal punishment is now counted a mark of failure in school government. We now govern the insane by carefully noting the normal faculties that remain and giving them exercise. In the same way we control and cure criminals, by an appeal to the highest normal faculties discoverable. Successful democracy assumes that normal adults also may be kept to tolerable courses of conduct by appeals to reason and conscience. Government in a democracy must become more and more consciously a matter of education and training.

In the light of the more careful and scientific study of society it becomes evident that all government is in large part a matter of education and training. Wild beasts are controlled by taming them and by keeping them from getting frightened — that is, by educating them. The government of men has often been compared to the government of wild beasts, but there is an essential difference in the process. Men never have been and they never can be governed as brutes are governed. We govern an animal by taming him; we govern a slave by scaring him. One slave is selected and signally punished in order to strike terror into the minds of other slaves. Slaves, as a class, fear their masters; masters, as a class, fear their slaves. Only such slaves are selected for vicarious punishment as can be punished safely. The attempt to treat human beings as brutes

results in treating them more brutally than animals can rationally be treated. Domestic animals are by nature saved from the worst indignities heaped upon slaves. Animals in their relations to men are treated as individuals. One animal cannot be taught to teach another; nor by punishing one animal can we mend the manners of another. But even in the lowest estate men are governed socially.

It is said that the founder of the late dynasty in the Hawaiian Islands wielded a spear longer by six feet than that of any other warrior. With his band of followers he went from island to island till all were conquered. He then placed his seat of judgment at the top of a lofty cliff, whence, having with his own hands dispatched delinquents, he would hurl their bodies down the steep. This surely has the appearance of government by force. The destruction of competitors for kingship may have been a matter of mere physical force; but terror is rather a spiritual than a physical force. Force is applied to one subject for the purpose of inducing an obedient spirit in other subjects. Force is, in such a case, a means of education. But a ruler needs support from motives other than fear. The attempt to rule by fear alone results in making both rulers and subjects the slaves of fear. In an atmosphere of fear, which is created by an attempt to govern by force, the minds of men become prey to all manner of superstitions. Rulers surround themselves with the air of mystery. They are supported by conjurers and wonder-workers. The people are induced to believe that rulers are of a different clay from themselves — that they have an origin wholly distinct from the common herd. Monarchy has always been surrounded and supported by false teachings and erroneous beliefs. Machiavelli was scientifically correct in his contention that the attempt to govern by force led necessarily to a government by lying. Force is a fact so striking and so obvious that in the crude attempts to portray history it has been vastly overestimated. In all governments, besides fear and superstition and deception and lying, there have been also love and friendly coöperation. In the democratic reading of history all influences will receive

due attention; force will be looked upon as a reminder of brutish origins — as a means of education and training to be employed with fitting shame and humility.

There are, then, two clearly distinguishable methods in education, corresponding to two distinct methods in government. In the one case, the appeal is chiefly to those faculties which man has in common with brutes. In the other, the appeal is chiefly to those higher faculties which distinguish men from brutes. It may seem like begging the question to maintain that democracy is necessarily the form which government must assume, as reason and conscience triumph over brute force; but it is to be remembered that the possible forms of government, as thus far defined, are not numerous, and that all forms save democracy suffer greatly from association with conduct and beliefs condemned by modern education. For practical purposes all that is necessary is the affirmation that the forces which make for democracy are so rooted and grounded in history as to make a thorough trial of democracy morally certain.

The real conflict of the ages is this same conflict between two methods in education corresponding to two methods in guiding the conduct of men. Science has appeared to be in conflict with theology; but this appearance of antagonism arose from the fact that a particular sort of theology was in alliance with a system of teaching by authority which rested upon brute force. The real conflict is between those in positions of power who have insisted upon treating the masses of men as dangerous wild animals and those who have contended for higher standards of justice. The one class have been driven to rely upon the authoritative teaching of error supported by the sword. The other class have been driven more and more to appeal to a common sense of justice, a common love of truth and a common opinion in favor of the higher capabilities of men.

The older method of teaching and governing is in harmony with a theory of the origin of the universe which is now generally thought to be erroneous — the theory that the world has been gotten into shape by a series of catastrophes and specific external interferences. The new method of teaching and

governing is in harmony with the doctrine of evolution. This is no captious or accidental correspondence: it is fundamental and essential. He who believes himself to be a part of a rebellious universe, which has had imposed upon it a tolerable degree of order, naturally allies himself with those who would impose order upon men; while he who sees in nature the order-working principle naturally seeks to discover in man the tendencies to a better order and to ally himself with those who would give these tendencies untrammelled development.

These contradictory theories of government have also natural affiliations with two diverse theories of law. The common law of England was worked out by observing the rules of conduct of the orderly moral members of the community and setting these rules forth as guides for the behavior of the less orderly. The law was not originally imposed: it was simply discovered among the people and reduced to practice. In like manner the Law of the Twelve Tables was a collection of just rules of conduct discovered in the community, and these rules were published in order that the people might be protected from the imposition of unjust rules by their magistrates. During the thousand years following the publication of the Twelve Tables, Roman law was amplified in the main by the work of wise men who continued to observe the conduct of moral communities and to enlarge the application of the rules of justice. The other theory of law assumes a monarch or a specific limited body of persons that, out of hand, lays down the law for all other persons to obey. According to the former theory, law is something to be progressively discovered by noting the conduct of moral citizens. This view is quite in harmony with modern education and modern democratic tendencies. Here again modern education is in harmony with the teaching of the ancient Greeks. To the Greek mind justice was not a thing to be imposed by some accidental lawgiver: it was rather the aspiration of the living state. It was to be looked for as the consummation of the perfect man in a perfected state.

It is the failure to distinguish between these two theories of law and government which leads to that negation of the func-

tion of thinking expressed in the modern phrase: "Conflict between the individual and the state." If the state is assumed to be a person, or a limited body of persons, seeking to govern all other individuals after the analogy of brutes, then indeed there is a clear case of conflict between the individual and the state. If, however, the state is a body politic seeking exact justice for all its members, the words are wholly without meaning. An individual apart from political and social relations is an unthinkable monstrosity. Such a creature has no existence, either in fact or in imagination. We know individuals through political and social relations. The more perfect these relations, the more complete is the individual. The Greeks looked upon the state as the chief agency for perfecting the man. Rightly understood, there is no more antithesis between the state and the individual than there is between a healthy living man and the cells that constitute his tissues. There is, however, a lasting antithesis between an unjust government and the victims of injustice.

Democracy is thus seen to be in harmony with many fundamental beliefs and principles, which have their roots deep in the past, that are gaining control of the minds of men. Its advent involves a reconstruction of history that is already well under way. So long as the movements of the nations were assumed to consist of a few spectacular events and to be determined by a few great men, history dealt with the unusual and the exceptional. But with the advent of science the belief prevails that from the beginning the really important factors in the evolution of history are found in the ordinary life of ordinary people. To the new readers of history former histories are of little use: they are as much out of place as ancient books on science. It is necessary to construct a history out of such sources as past ages have left. This is called, in the phrase of the day, "writing history from original sources." It is, indeed, an attempt to construct a useful history out of all possible sources. Gardiner's volumes on the Commonwealth from 1649 to 1654 will probably be accepted as among the best illustrations of the new methods. The

materials are comparatively abundant, and there are many co-laborers in the field. Masson's life of Milton involved the use of much of the same material. Gardiner ought to be read with Carlyle's *Cromwell* constantly in mind. Carlyle never came so near to writing history in the modern sense as when he determined to "let Oliver speak for himself." Carlyle, however, never really allowed anybody to speak for himself. Yet from the number of references to his collection of materials his contribution must be deemed important in the new history.

For the reader, however, the chief use of Carlyle is in the contrast he affords between the old reading of history and the new. Carlyle makes history consist of the doings of a few great men. Only get a man born once or twice in a century, and all is well; attention to ordinary mortals is a waste of time. Nearly all that Gardiner has written belongs to that class of literature which Carlyle designates by the expressive word "dryasdust." With infinite detail Gardiner works out the actual homely experiences of the very real men into whose hands the care of an empire came. There is no attempt to enliven the narrative or to make it interesting. To the reader of such a history the interest must lie wholly in a desire to know how forces then appeared which are now seen to be working in the history of the nation. To such a reader the narrative is eminently satisfactory. There is the comfortable impression of trustworthiness and fair dealing. There are no tricks of style, no treacherous antitheses.

Carlyle characterizes Cromwell as "the soul of the Puritan Revolt, without whom it had never been a revolt transcendently memorable and an Epoch in the World's History." Gardiner also makes Cromwell the hero of the Revolution, but we are made to see how it came about. Apart from his superior military genius, Cromwell was great chiefly because of his readiness to adapt his conduct to the demands of the dominant opinions about him. At one time or another he entered into alliance with nearly every religious sect in the country. When the democrats in the army determined to compass the death of the king, Cromwell sought to save the king's life. His partiality

for the king became so marked that his position in the army was seriously threatened. When resistance became hopeless, he yielded, and the king was beheaded. Later, when the Fifth Monarchy faction determined to expel the Long Parliament, Cromwell said that the very thought of the thing made his hair stand on end. He resisted the measure almost to the last moment and then gave way. Though he once yielded in Ireland to the demand for vengeance, the chief characteristic of his Irish policy was in harmony with a more just and humane treatment of the Catholic Irish. At one time he undoubtedly contemplated the possibility of making himself king, but afterwards he strenuously resisted all such proposals. Gardiner's closing passage in his second volume reads:

If the Restoration is to be regarded, not as a mere change of the forms of government, but as a return to a mode of thought anterior to Puritanism, it may fairly be said that the spirit of the Restoration had at last effected a lodgment within the bosom of Oliver himself.

This is said with reference to a policy adopted late in 1654 for extending commerce in the West Indies.

In the new reading of history the great man is he who best represents the ideas which his age is trying to express. Cromwell did represent the idea of religious toleration. He said he would permit Mohammedanism rather than have one tender conscience coerced. Again, Cromwell represented the spirit of law and order which is among the deep sentiments of the English. With these guiding principles he was ready to adapt himself to the changing emergencies of the time.

As already intimated, the success of democracy is dependent upon the possibility of obtaining from men tolerable courses of conduct by education and training, by appeals to reason and conscience rather than to force. The military equipments of Christendom, however, do not now indicate any immediate diminution of force in government. This is a fact which is unfavorable to the immediate triumph of democracy. If the army of a nation is used chiefly against the citizens of that nation, there can be no real democracy. The case is different

where armies are kept together for causes external. Yet the general triumph of democracy must involve the introduction of reason and conscience in the settlement of international as well as of domestic relations.

The experience of the Commonwealth is fitted to throw a good deal of light on the relation of an army to free government.

It is never possible [says Gardiner] for men of the sword to rear the temple of recovered freedom. . . . No government they could set up would be strong enough to remain unless the army were kept on foot, and if the army were kept on foot popular support would be alienated by its interference in political affairs.

Throughout the eleven years there was a constant effort to avoid the "vicious circle," and all the time there was a working forward to the inevitable conclusion—a restored monarchy. At Worcester the army determined that a king could not be forced upon the nation; but the army was powerless to determine how the nation should be permanently governed. Government by the sword and democratic government are contradictory terms.

So long as the Commonwealth was threatened with immediate destruction from outside pressure, it had strong support in the nation. The five years presented in Gardiner's two volumes were entirely occupied with the wars in Ireland, in Scotland, with the Dutch, with Spain and with France. And these wars were all turned to the advantage of England. It was that sentiment in the nation which was most in harmony with the spirit of democracy that gave to the New Model its invincible character. That army was resistless in its mission of destruction to venerable institutions of tyranny. It could vindicate the honor of England against foreign foes, but it could not rule the United Kingdom as a democracy. It could not do this, because there was no educated and trained self-conscious body politic which was in a position to give commands to the army itself and to make it a subordinate agent of the nation.

Gardiner's words are fitted to give the impression that the vicious circle is peculiar to a commonwealth; but the same or a similar vicious circle inheres in every attempt to govern by

force. The ruler must become more and more exacting. This causes increased opposition. The conclusion is revolution or national decay. The vicious circle continued after the Restoration until, in the Victorian age, there has appeared a trained constituency to whom all officers look for guidance and direction. The circle ceases to be vicious only when the appeal to public opinion is believed to make for justice and all classes are disposed to order their conduct accordingly.

The new education and modern science are rapidly undermining the feelings and beliefs upon which monarchy and aristocracy have rested. There remain only military despotism and plutocracy. Just now the most formidable rival to democracy is plutocracy supported by military despotism. In the past such a government has received less moral sanction than almost any other. The question of chief concern in the immediate future is whether science shall become prevailingly allied to plutocracy and privilege or whether it shall remain true to the spirit which gave it birth, seek to expose to the light of day every species of industrial, social and political injustice, and endeavor to point out the way for amelioration. That its influence will be thrown upon the side of truth and righteousness may well be inferred from the spirit which its devotees have heretofore displayed. The triumph of modern science has been distinctly a triumph of faith and of the preaching of righteousness. A considerable body of men have recognized and assumed a high moral obligation to learn what is true about the material universe. Of the universe one man in a lifetime can see only an infinitesimal part. If knowledge is to be rapidly advanced, men must learn to accept as true the reports of co-laborers. Coöperation is absolutely necessary. The promoters of science feel themselves helpless, unless men may be trusted to see all that is visible and to make full and accurate report of all that is seen. This involves the exercise of faith — faith in the trustworthiness of the powers of observation and, above all, in the truthfulness of co-laborers. Without knowing it, the promoters of science have become most aggressive preachers of a very old-fashioned orthodox dictum of righteousness. They have

made a terrific attack upon the sin of unbelief. Given a trustworthy observer and a truthful reporter, there ensues the high moral obligation to believe the report and to seek to give full effect to all rational conclusions. Believing a lie in the face of adequate evidence to the contrary is sin. Under given conditions, believing a lie may indicate a lower condition of moral degradation than telling a lie. Under this new exercise of faith and effective preaching there has grown up a mystical scientific world whose members are distributed throughout the leading nations. In this world there are no liars. In but few instances have men been accused of lying in respect to the subject-matter of physical science. In this world men are free from prejudice; they believe according to evidence; they count it a high moral duty to keep the mind open to all truth which relates to the world of phenomena; they exercise a generous coöperative spirit in all that pertains to the advancement of science. Yet a man may fulfill all these conditions and be a veritable knave in ordinary political and social relations.

It would seem that, if men are to be permitted to lie anywhere, it ought to be in the chemical laboratory, where detection is easy and where the phenomena are not changed by false beliefs. The material universe holds right on faithful and true, no matter what men believe about it. Not so in politics: political and social institutions are affected by what men believe. Venerable institutions and customs hold on for ages, crushing the life out of the people, because of false teaching and erroneous beliefs. The men of science cannot be true to their calling, if they do not seek to carry the scientific spirit and the scientific methods into all the hard places of human experience. It is difficult to imagine a meaner man than he who has found the one easy place in the universe for being truth-loving and truth-telling—a place where the motive for lying is almost *nil*, a place that has been made entirely safe by the sacrifices of saints and martyrs—and from this secure place reviles other men who are trying to carry truth into politics, because, forsooth, they seem to him to lack somewhat of the scientific spirit. Science can be true to its origin and

true to itself only as it seeks to realize the scientific spirit in every field of experience. The scientific spirit can come into industry and politics only by an aggressive spirit of righteousness — a passion for justice. Being a knave does not prevent one from keeping the mind open to all phenomena in the physical laboratory. But being a knave does prevent one from keeping the mind open to social and political phenomena. The secrets of justice can be revealed only to him who is prepared, at whatever cost, to render justice. The doing of social wrong renders difficult or impossible the seeing of social truth.

There have been prophets who have given correct forecasts as to events, but have been woefully awry as to dates. Thus, Admiral Blake asserted, after a few years' trial of the Commonwealth, that monarchy was at an end; that it had vanished from England forever; that it was just passing from France; and that within ten years Spain would be a republic. Now, after two hundred and fifty years, it seems not unreasonable to allow yet a term for monarchy in Spain to close its accounts with the people. If a military plutocracy should rule the twentieth century, our author's prophecy might still be good for some other century.

Just what was the nature of those proposals which were "such as to commend themselves to the men of the twentieth century rather than to those of the seventeenth"? I have already discussed religious toleration and freedom of teaching. These were proposals negative in their character. Then there was the positive proposal to establish a permanent republic. But the Puritan proposals cannot be understood by reference to any one detail or to any collection of details. The Puritans sought to embody in their Commonwealth a principle which is as old as history. They felt the need of a more righteous order; they believed in the possibility of its attainment; and with a high sense of obligation they proceeded to reduce their beliefs to practice. The Puritans were met by men equally conscientious who were devoted to the established order. The Cavaliers, who returned to power with the restored Stuart monarch, were horrified at the confusion which had arisen

between the "Commons of England" and the "common people of England." In their view it was the duty of the Commons to keep their heels firmly planted upon the necks of the common people and to govern them with a stern hand. Their answer to the plea of the Fifth Monarchy men, that it is the duty of the righteous to govern the world, was: "We are the righteous, and we are providentially placed in the position of rulers." So long as the issue is between two factions, each of which asserts dogmatically that it has the right to rule and backs the assertion by an appeal to the sword, the few will ever prevail over the many. If history teaches anything, it teaches that, if the masses are to be ruled by the sword, the tendency will always be for power to pass into fewer hands. But if governments are to be carried on by persuasion and by appeals to the higher moral sense, the tendency will be to widen the constituency.

JESSE MACY.

IOWA COLLEGE.